

2. HOMELAND DEFENSE AND COMBATING TERRORISM

[Related topics: 1.13, 1.17, 1.23, 1.32, 1.34, 3.36, 3.45, 3.46, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.14, 4.20, 4.24, 4.26, 4.33, 5.5, 5.6, 5.38]

2.1 Do U.S. government definitions of Homeland Defense (HD) and Homeland Security (HS), as reflected in current strategies, generate clear expectations regarding DoD and DHS respective roles and missions?

- Are there ambiguities and overlaps between DoD and DHS roles and missions?
- What is the operational effect; e.g., are there important overlaps and/or seams between HD and HS activities?
- Do the definitions set clear expectations for the public? Are steps needed to clarify these roles and missions? If so, make appropriate recommendations.
- What case studies provide illustrations of the expectations regarding DoD and DHS roles and missions?

POC: Mr. Don Herr, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Strategy, Plans, and Resources, OASD(HD)/SP&R, 703-602-5730, ext. 153

Priority: 1

Key Terms: homeland defense, homeland security, definitions, expectations, roles and missions, DoD, DHS

2.2 How can an analyst achieve a temporal paradigm shift such that he can model the situational perceptions, ideology and decision-making of extremist groups?

- Discuss an extremist paradigm as it relates to operational activity (attack planning) in the West?
- How can terrorist paradigms be infused into a “Red Team” of diverse analysts such that, for example, the team is able to emulate the decision-making of a Sunni extremist planning cell in the United States?
- How can this infusion process take place in a conference room setting, given multimedia equipment and/or other instructional/sensitization materials?
- Given only 4, 8, or 16 hours for instruction/sensitization, what data should be introduced and how should it be presented to maximize the effectiveness of the infusion process?

POC: Mr. Rob Cordray, N-NC/J22AV, (719) 554-8640

Priority: 1

Key Terms: Terrorism, Threat Analysis, Red Teaming, Cultural Intelligence, Ethnography, Cultural Anthropology, Psychology

2.3 How do we combat the “spontaneous terrorist?”

- Focus on those who are not affiliated with, supported by, or led by established groups.
- What are the triggers for these sympathetic “bystanders” to take violent action?
- What are the indicators and where do we look for them?
- How can we best intercede to dissuade such action?

POC: Lt Col Donald Shaffer, JCS/J5, (703) 693-2023

Priority: 1

Key terms: Spontaneous terrorist

2.4 Identify and assess adversaries' concepts related to Nuclear, Biological & Chemical (NBC) and radiological weapons use.

- Select a region, nation, or non-state actor and describe its potential for employment of NBC or radiological weapons.
- Consider the political and military purposes of use or threat of use.
- Analyze an adversary's internal political-military dynamic (leadership), rhetoric or stated doctrine, and historical use (if any).
- How likely is an adversary to use NBC or radiological weapons or devices? How can the U.S. deter state and non-state actors from using such weapons? Are current counterproliferation operations an effective deterrent against the use of NBC devices by state or non-state actors?

POC: BG (Ret) Russ Howard, Tufts University, (617) 627-4740

Priority: 1

Key Terms: adversaries, NBC, radiological, U.S. response, historical use, adversarial use of NBC, deterrence, terrorism, state actor, non-state actor

2.5 What are the most likely CBRN threats to NORAD/NORTHCOM assets (e.g. industrial accident/transportation accident/sabotage/attack), in priority order, and how was this priority established?

- For each threat, what are the possible actions?
- For each threat, what is the likely progression of the scenario from first detection to military involvement?
- How would N/NC know which threat is developing, or has materialized? (What are the detection conditions/triggers?)

POC: NORAD/J33N (LTC Dickerson/Mr. Greg Playle)

Priority: 1

Key Terms: CBRN threat

2.6 CBRN events are not confined to a given "bordered" area. What are the constraints to NORAD/NORTHCOM interactions across international borders (both Mexico and Canada) and how might they be addressed (legal, international, treaty, physical)?

- What are the homeland defense/civil support implications of each border, both from U.S. to the other nation, and from the other nation to the U.S.?
- What about maritime (coastal) areas (including Great Lakes)?

POC: NORAD/J33N (LTC Dickerson/Mr. Greg Playle), JTF-N (Lt Col Gwen Baker)

Priority: 1

Key Terms: International borders, constraints

2.7 What is the threat posed to CONUS by the current flow of special interest aliens (SIA) across the national borders and what can USNORTHCOM do to counter the threat to our national security?

- What is the extent of the threat?
- What can USNORTHCOM do to assist in countering the threat?
- What are the legal issues associated with this question?
- How does this relate to SOCOM's role?
- What is the impact of legal SIAs versus illegal SIAs?

POC: CDR Patrick Braker, N/NC J22DO, (719) 554-7591

Priority: 1

Key Terms: N/NC J2, intelligence, threat

2.8 How do we begin to develop the architecture to expand the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) to include Mexico to a greater extent?

- What is the optimal security relationship between the U.S. and Canada?
- What is the best vehicle to formalize that relationship?
- What cooperative defense structure best operationalizes that relationship?
- How are the answers to follow-up questions 1-3 impacted by the eventual addition of Mexico?

POC: Dr. Biff Baker, Bi-National Planning Group, BPG, (719) 554-7614, Mr. Mike Hanyok, NC J31, (719) 554-3758

Priority: 1

Key Terms: Canada, United States, Defense, Security and Domain Awareness

2.9 Demonstrations of military force have a proven utility. What might be the utility of demonstrations of cyber force as a crisis management tool?

- Should decision makers regard information operations as comprising an analogous capability as conventional or strategic military forces as tools for managing crises?
- What would distinguish displays, demonstrations, and uses of cyber force in actual practice?
- Is the distinction between offensive and defensive uses of force useful in this context?
- What considerations should decision makers bear in mind when considering displays, demonstrations, or uses of cyber force in the context of a crisis?
- What legal and ethical issues does this raise?

POC: Mark Hewitt, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), OASD (HD)/DCCR, 703-681-3030

Priority: 1

Key Terms: cyber force, demonstration of force, information operations, crisis management, offense, defense, legal, ethical

2.10 What should DoD be prepared to do in response to a cyber attack?

- What types of cyber attacks will have an impact on DoD and specifically USNORTHCOM?
- In the Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) role, what support can USNORTHCOM provide to civil authorities to respond and recover from cyber attack?
- What would be the effect of a cyber attack on the internet structure as a precursor to hostile kinetic action elsewhere?

Point of Contact: Rich Affeld, USNORTHCOM/J39, (719) 554-1589

Priority: 1

Key Terms: National Cyber Response Options, Critical Infrastructure Protection, cyber defense, government responsibility for commercial infrastructure, cyber economy

2.11 How can DoD best contribute to Combating Ideological Support to Terrorism (CIST)?

- NMSP-WOT lists several “indirect” approaches such as understanding that how we plan and conduct our operations can impact on adversary ideology. Are there other indirect approaches and considerations?
- Are there more direct approaches appropriate for DoD?

POC: Lt Col Donald Shaffer, JCS/J5, (703) 693-2023

Priority: 1

Key terms: public diplomacy, strategic information, Combating Ideological Support to Terrorism, CIST

2.12 How best can U.S. Northern Command integrate into the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) mandated DHS National Bio-surveillance Integration System (NBIS)?

- Which computer systems/programs are adequate for integrating multiple, disparate data streams, both medical and non-medical?
- Which traditional and non-traditional data systems are vital to a functional NBIS?
- Which non-medical data streams might be medically relevant to NBIS?
- Which near-term surveillance technologies should be aggressively funded to enhance homeland defense and homeland security surveillance capabilities?
- How best to train medical intelligence analysts?

POC: Col Tony Rizzo, N/SGO, (719) 554-0937

Priority: 1

Key Terms: Bio-surveillance, medical/veterinarian intelligence, Department of Homeland Security, Inter-agency effort, training, collection of homeland defense information, HHS

2.13 What are the implications for DoD of mass-casualty terrorist incidents, including at casualty levels well beyond current planning?

- What will the U.S. public and Congress expect of DoD?
- Develop specific scenarios and determine likely requirements for DoD support.
- Conduct survey of current DoD and other federal capabilities.
- If DoD is directed to provide maximum support, would DoD become the Lead Federal Agency (LFA)? What would be the likely effect on DoD capabilities for other operations?
- What are the implications for DoD planning and programming?
- What is a reasonable casualty threshold for planning?
- When and under what conditions should DoD transition its responsibilities to civil authorities?

POC: Mr. Don Herr, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Strategy, Plans, and Resources, OASD(HD)/SP&R, 703-602-5730, ext. 153

Priority: 1

Key Terms: mass-casualty, planning, civil authorities, federal

2.14 What is the acceptable risk in conducting CBRNE remains recovery and processing? (See also topics 2.30, 2.31)

- Explore differences in Military code of "leave no service member behind" (also seen in WTC post 9/11) vs. generally accepted Mortuary Affairs principle of "we will not risk the living for the dead."
- At what point is the value of recovering the dead greater than the health risk to mass fatality management personnel?
- How do we determine the level of health risk to mass fatality management personnel?
- How do political, social, cultural, religious, media, legal, medical and operational factors influence the decision process?

POC: Mr. John Nesler (JTF-CS/J4, (757) 788-6298)

Priority: 1

Key Terms: Risk Assessment, mass fatality management, CBRNE remains recovery and processing

2.15 Examine Federal v. State Responsibilities for Public Safety and Security. (See also topics 2.20, 2.22, 2.28)

- Both the Federal Government and state governments are responsible for public safety and security. Since 9/11, the line between the Federal Government's responsibilities and those of state governments is even more ill-defined
- What are the proper DoD responsibilities in relation to situations where DoD is the Lead Federal Agency or acting as a supporting agency?
 - Examine Federal Government and State Government responsibilities, as defined by statute and regulation.
 - Identify redundancies or seams between these responsibilities.

- Assess and compare Federal Government and State Government expenditures on public safety and security – focused on homeland security – in light of their statutory and regulatory responsibilities and identified redundancies and/or seams.

POC: LTC Jon Sims (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), OASD(HD)/HLSI, 703-614-2783 (DSN 224))

Priority: 2

Key Terms: federal government, state government, public safety, roles and responsibilities, overlaps, seams

2.16 Should the DoD fund Civil Support Teams (CSTs)?

- Currently, by law, Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams are funded and certified by the Secretary of Defense and under the operational control of the governors of the states (Title 32, U.S.C.)
- In accordance with Sec. 1403 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (PL 107-314), the number of WMD-CST will be 55, one for each State and Territory, including two for the state of California.
- The purpose of this study would be to:
 - Examine and assess the history of the establishment and expansion of the WMD-CST
 - Compare the costs, advantages, and disadvantages of continuing the status quo (DoD-funded with National Guard personnel) and a civilianized WMD-CST (Federally-funded—possibly funded with National Guard personnel) and a civilianized WMD-CST (Federally-funded—possibly by DHS—with civilian personnel)

POC: LTC Jon Sims, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), OASD(HD)/HLSI, 703-614-2783 (DSN 224)

Priority: 2

Key Terms: civil support teams (CST), National Guard, military-civilian relationship, Title 32

2.17 How do we measure how well COCOMs are performing in their Homeland Defense mission to detect, prevent, and defeat attacks?

- What are the primary alternative approaches to determine measures of effectiveness for the NORTHCOM mission areas of deterring, detecting, preventing, and defeating clandestine attacks?
- What lessons can be taken from other agencies/mission sets (e.g. Cold War deterrence, counter-drug operations, FBI counterterrorism)?
- How do other combatant commands assess their mission requirements and effectiveness in similar areas?

POC: Mr. Gene Pfeffer (N/NC IC, (719) 554-5913)

Priority: 2

Key Terms: Measures of effectiveness

2.18 What are the optimum education and training curriculum and courses for HLD and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)?

- Survey and compare and Homeland Defense/Homeland Security curricula.
- What are the competencies and best practices for HLD/HLS?
- What are the standards for curriculum content for the discipline of HLD and DSCA?
- How can HLD and DSCA curriculum content best be identified?
- What research methodologies and approaches can be used to refine HLD and DSCA curriculum content?
- How should HLD and DSCA courses be structured?
- What is the appropriate balance of HLD and DSCA courses?
- How are the curriculum, instruction and assessment aspects of HLD and DSCA course best served?

POC: Dr. Houston Polson (N/NC J7, (719) 554-7182)

Priority: 2

Key Terms: Education and training, curriculum, instruction, HLD and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) subject matter content

2.19 Examine how recent terrorist attacks affected regional security cooperation.

- How has the perceived need for greater protection against terrorism affected border controls and other aspects of national and regional security?
- How have differing perceptions of the threat from terrorism affected regional security cooperation?
- Explore the role of regional security organizations in fighting the war on terrorism.

POC: COL Cindy Jebb (USMA, 845-938-3074) and Dr. Kent Butts (U.S. Army War College, 717-245-3728)

Priority: 2

Key Terms: globalization, terrorism, nation building, multilateral organizations, failed states, regional stability, soft power

2.20 What role should NORAD/NORTHCOM, DoD and its appropriate sub-components play in developing an integrated Federal, state, and local homeland security/homeland defense training infrastructure to support individual and collective training to enhance interoperability? (See also topics 2.15, 2.22, 2.28)

- How can DoD's training transformation efforts be leveraged for support?
- How can DHS' HSPD-8 implementation efforts be leveraged for support?
- How should NORAD/NORTHCOM's Homeland Security/Homeland Defense Education Consortium be integrated with DHS' National Domestic Preparedness Consortium?

POC: Mr. Jan Ithier (N/NC WO, (703) 695-4604)

Priority: 2

Key Terms: Individual education, collective training, training infrastructure

2.21 What key Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) initiatives are required to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance the overall HLD posture of the U.S.?

- Can the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) be effectively prosecuted in all areas of the NC/SOUTHCOM/PACOM Areas of Responsibility (AORs)? What shortfalls need to be overcome through TSC initiatives?
- What are the special challenges regarding Mexico that must be addressed through an interagency effort?
- What are the strategic issues associated with Canadian participation in regional defense?
- What other TSCs with other countries can be agreed to reduce overall vulnerabilities?

POC: Mr. Toth (NC/J5, (719) 554-7901)

Priority: 2

Key Terms: TSC, GWOT, Canada, Mexico

2.22 Assess potential challenges for civil-military relations from DoD's growing involvement in HD activities. (See also topics 2.15, 2.20, 2.28)

- Does DoD's growing domestic role pose a potential threat to U.S. civil liberties?
 - What problems could arise, for example, if USNORTHCOM is directed to take the lead at a time of national emergency?
- Are current constraints on DoD's role adequate to preserve the principle of civilian control of the military?
- What measures, if any, are needed to ensure that our freedoms are protected?

POC: Mr. Don Herr (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Strategy, Plans, and Resources, OASD(HD)/SP&R, 703-602-5730, ext. 153)

Priority: 2

Key Terms: civil-military relations, civil liberties, civilian control of military

2.23 What is the optimal USG organization for the new strategic environment?

- How should the USG structure itself in order to effectively execute synchronized and integrated multi-agency operations around the globe?
- How would reorganization empower leadership's authority to compel across the interagency?
- Do we need a "Beyond 'Beyond' Goldwater-Nichols?"
- Should DoD and State align their respective global regions? Would this help integration efforts?"

POC: Lt Col Donald Shaffer, JCS/J5, (703) 693-2023

Priority: 2

Key terms: Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, interagency, global regions, new strategic environment

2.24 How do DoD budget processes hinder our ability to maneuver in the new strategic environment?

- What changes can be made to the current 2-year cycle to allow more flexibility to fund “pop-up” requirements?

POC: Lt Col Donald Shaffer, JCS/J5, (703) 693-2023

Priority: 2

Key terms: budget process, new strategic environment

2.25 What are the Centers of Gravity (COG) associated with homeland security (HLS) and/or homeland defense (HLD)?

- Does the United States have a National COG(s)? What must the nation do to protect that COG(s)?
- Does designating a National COG help synchronize the application of the instruments of National Power (DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, economic)?
- What is/are the Military COG(s) associated with HLD?

POC: Mr. Toth (NC/J5, (719) 554-7901)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: Center of gravity (COG), diplomatic, informational, military, economic (DIME), homeland security (HLS), homeland defense (HLD)

2.26 How does bounded rationality contribute to failures of judgment during complex crises?

- How are limits on human judgment and cognitive ability manifested under stress?
- Is it possible to categorize failures in human judgment?
- What environmental variables influence decision making under stress?
- Do these variables change across different categories of failures in judgment?
- This research topic lends itself to a survey of the literature and/or case studies.

POC: Mark Hewitt (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), OASD(HD)/DCCR, 703-681-3030)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: crisis management, decision making, human judgment, bounded rationality

2.27 Can international crisis management and domestic incident management be integrated?

- Characterize international crisis and domestic incident management.
- Are these crises and incidents different in terms of objectives, outcomes, processes, and requirements?
- If so, can these objectives, outcomes, processes, and requirements be synthesized?
- What features might characterize a synthesized system for managing both international security crises and domestic incidents?

POC: Mark Hewitt (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), OASD(HD)/DCCR, 703-681-3030)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: crisis management, incident management, domestic, international

2.28 What is appropriate NORTHCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM involvement in federal, state, tribal, and local government exercises? (Also see topics 2.15, 2.20, 2.22)

- Identify the exercises being conducted.
- Who are the key players and at what capacity/frequency can they be expected to participate?
- What state and local players should be engaged most frequently and what is the priority by state?
- What funding is available and how can it be 'fenced' for state (all levels) participation in a national exercise program?
- What is required for USNORTHCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM implementation (i.e. budget, scheduling, policy, training, non-DoD coordination etc.)?
- Assist state and local governments in de-conflicting multiples exercises.
- What is the most effective means for collecting and incorporating non-DoD input for exercise Master Scenario Event Lists (MSELs)?
- How can we best disseminate results of exercises (lessons learned, classification)?

POC: Dr. Houston Polson (N/NC J7, (719) 554-7182)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: Exercises, interagency, coordination, participation

2.29 Examine homeland security/defense efforts to prevent and deal with non-catastrophic attacks.

- Is the Catastrophic Incident Index of the National Response Plan adequate to define a “catastrophic attack?” What should be the numeric definition of a “catastrophic attack?” What role should the military play?
- How should the U.S. prepare for a series of attacks that do not cause massive casualties? What are the implications for budgets and other resources should the U.S. need to repeatedly respond?

POC: BG (Ret) Russ Howard, Tufts University, (617) 627-4740

Priority: 3

Key Terms: WMD, terrorism, homeland security, homeland defense, NORTHCOM, civil support

2.30 What is the most effective method to rapidly integrate Federal Interagency Mortuary Affairs (MA) assets with local responder MA organizations? (Also see topics 2.14, 2.31)

- How do we map comparative units/individuals to effectively integrate military capabilities into federal and local units with MA missions?

- What is the best methodology and/or metrics to provide comparisons between military, federal and local MA capabilities (e.g. DOTLMP-F)? Provided comparisons for MA using this methodology.
- Does the current inability to accurately map capabilities result in inefficiencies with sourcing military support? If so, then to what extent? Are there recommendations for more efficient structures to enable better integration capabilities?
- Can the use of MA trained augmentees or modularized MA units provide more effective support?
- Is additional policy required to link NRP level MA guidance further with local and interagency efforts?

POC: Mr. John Nesler (JTF-CS/J7, (757) 788-6298)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: Integration, capability mapping, DOTMLP-F, mortuary affairs, efficient employment

2.31 What is the USNORTHCOM Combatant Commander's intent on the handling of deceased military members from an incident? (Also see topics 2.14, 2.30)

- How will the different jurisdictional issues shape that intent?
- Who will be identified as military?
- If there is different treatment given to military deceased, what is the public perception and how does it affect public trust?
- If states release military remains then what:
 - Special packaging to get them to Dover Port Mortuary?
 - What is the logistics footprint to execute?
 - Would we need the creation of special Armed Forces Medical Examiner site teams for all the bases with dead?
- If separate procedures for the military/civilians are conducted what is the impact on the ability of the military to the civil support mission?

POC: Mr. John Nesler (JTF-CS/J4, (757) 788-6298)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: Mortuary affairs, public trust, civilian casualty procedures, military fatalities

2.32 How do social networks respond and adapt to complex, unanticipated events?

- Is it possible to formulate a useful taxonomy of varieties of shocks to social networks?
- What models exist to understand the impact of these shocks on social networks?
- What characteristics of social networks permit or constrain systemic adaptation to shocks?
- By what means can these characteristics be manipulated in advance?
- What are the priorities for further research in this area?

POC: Mark Hewitt (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), OASD(HD)/DCCR, 703-681-3030)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: taxonomy, social networks, unanticipated events, social shock

2.33 What are DoD's and NORTHCOM's roles in critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and protecting the defense industrial base (DIB)?

- How does DoD plan for CIP when the potential target set is huge?
- How should the DIB be defined? How is/should the CIP be prioritized?
- What are/should be NORTHCOM's role in protecting the DIB? CIP?
- What capabilities/force packages are required for protecting and defending CIP and DIB?

POC: Mr. Toth (NC/J5, (719) 554-7901)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: Critical infrastructure, CIP, defense industrial base, DIB

2.34 How can NORAD/NORTHCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM effectively communicate with the various lead Federal agencies acting under the National Response Plan or in the event of a national disaster?

- What methods of communication are used by Federal agencies and how interoperable are they?
- What are the current legal and policy barriers to information sharing?
- How can dissimilar communication systems be integrated for effective HLD, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM communications?
- What should be the primary uses of wireless communications for emergency responders?
- How can NORAD/USNORTHCOM effectively utilize non-government amateur communication systems to support national communications in the event of a national disaster?
- What approaches have other homeland security entities used to resolve the integration of interagency communications?
- How can NORAD/USNORTHCOM ensure that it utilizes the SIPRNET only when appropriate?

What are the implications of over classification?

Does the extent of over classification that does occur damage the efforts of the interagency? Coalition cooperation?

By what means might over classification of material be reduced?

POC: Mr. Dan Petitt (N/NC J633, (719) 554-6218); CDR Matt Feely (N/NC J4, (719) 554-0783); Col Richard Iler (NGB-J2, (703) 607-1822)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: Communications, homeland security, national disaster, wireless, communications integration, Federal government interagency cooperation, NORAD/USNORTHCOM

2.35 How does the U.S. Government convey a coordinated message to inform the public to deal with HLS/HLD situations?

- How do we best integrate public diplomacy, public affairs, and the media?
- How does the DoD synchronize with DHS and other agencies?
- How should DoD train and educate its personnel to accomplish synchronization?

POC: Mr. Toth (NC/J5, (719) 554-7901)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: Strategic communications, diplomacy, public affairs, information operations (IO)

2.36 How can NORAD/USNORTHCOM ensure networks are protected against malicious code and vulnerabilities resulting from software design flaws and improper implementation?

- How can vulnerabilities be identified, and their effects analyzed in a timely and realistic way?
- How can dissemination, receipt, acknowledgement, and processing of vulnerability alerts and bulletins be performed in a timely and risk-appropriate way?
- How can instances of these vulnerabilities be discovered in systems and network devices?
- How can the operational impacts of vulnerability remediation be determined, and if those impacts are unacceptable, how can risk assessment and mitigation be performed in a timely and effective way?
- How can remediation of vulnerabilities through the application of corrective measures be performed effectively and in a timely way?
- How can successful remediation be verified, and how can compliance status with respect to alerts and bulletins be assessed and reported?
- What approaches have other combatant commands used to solve this issue?

POC: Maj Rob Peterman (N/NC J6, (719) 554-4922)

Priority: 3

Key Terms: Vulnerability management, patch management, J6

2.37 How can we remove the barriers to communication between DoD, non-DoD, Federal, and First Responders within the NC AOR?

- What are the protocols, procedures, and technologies available to rapidly re-allocate DoD and civilian bandwidth in support of response and recovery operations?
- What national communication interoperability and compatibility standards need to be established?
- How should these standards be implemented and enforced? Is a CRAF for bandwidth a viable concept?
- Which established policies and procedures need to be addressed to remove these barriers?
- What technology exists to support the initiative?

Point of Contact: Maj Dave Mott, N/NC J8, (719) 554-4439

Priority: 3

Key Terms: Communications barriers, spectrum management